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CASES NOTED
BANKS - GARNISHMENT - PRIOR RIGHT TO
DEBTOR'S DEPOSIT
A judgment creditor sought to garnish the debtor's bank account.
After service of the writ of garnishment, the bank attempted to apply the
debtor's deposit to his note which was held by the bank, and which pro-
vided for acceleration if the holder deemed the debt insecure. Held, the
bank could apply the deposit of the debtor to his note in their hands
although garnishment proceedings by the judgment creditor had already
been initiated. State National Bank of Decatur at Oneonta v. Towns, 62
So.2d 606 (Ala. 1952).
A bank has the right to apply the whole or part of his deposit to any
matured indebtedness of a depositor to the bank.' While the bank's right
to apply the debtor's deposit to the payment of his indebtedness to the
bank has, by some courts, been called a lien, the debtor-creditor relationship
resulting from the general deposit has induced many courts to label it setof i. 2
Whether it be called a lien or a setoff, the right of a bank to apply the
matured indebtedness of its depositor against the latter's bank account exists
although the account has been garnished at the instance of a creditor of
the depositor3 However, the cases manifestly indicate that a bank may
not apply a deposit to the payment of an unmatured debt 4 of its depositor.,
The two outstanding exceptions to this rile are where the rights and obli-
gations have been specifically altered by contract,6 and where the debtor
has become insolvent prior to garnishment. 7
It is well settled that there is no necessity for a bank to make book
1. United States v. National City Bank of N. Y., 90 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. N.Y.
1950); In re Susquehanna Chemical Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. First State Bank, 143 Tex. 164, 183 SAV.2d 422 (1944).
2. Sherberg v. First Nat. Bank of Englewood, 122 Colo. 407, 222 P.2d 782 (1950);
Teeters v. City Nat. Bank of Auburn, 214 Ind. 498, 14 N.E.2d 1004 (1938); First
Nat. Bank of Schulenberg v. Winkler, 199 Tex. 131, 161 S.W.2d 1053 (1942).
3. United States v. Bank of U. S.. 5 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Walters v.
Bank of America Nat. Trst & Say. Ass'n, 7 Cal.2d 28, 59 P.2d 983 (1936).
4. Pendleton v. Hellman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank, 58 Cal. App. 448, 208
Pac. 702 (1922) announced the majority view saying, "Where the debt to the bank
is not due, the banker's right of setoff does not exist."
5. Kane v. First Nat. Bank, 56 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1932); Gillette v. Williams-
ville State Bank, 310 I11. App. 395. 34 N.E.2d 552 (1941).
6. Boston Continental Nat. Bank v. Hub. Fruit Co., 285"Mass. 187, 189 N.E. 89
1934); Forastiere v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 303 Mass. 101, 20 N.E.2d 950
1939).
. Norris v. Commercial National Bank of Anniston, 231 Ala. 204, 163 So. 768
91935); Pendleton v. lellman Trust & Say. Bank, 58 Cal. App. 448, 208 Pac. 702
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
entries prior to service-of. a writ of garnishment in ordet, to claim the setoff.,
It is sufficient that there be a valid matured debt owing to the bank.9 The
word "matured", when applied to commercial paper means the time when
the paper. becomes, due and demandable, and 411 action can be maintained
thereon to enforce payment.'?. WVhile "in acceleration clause creates the
right to consider the note due and'phyblc, it is not self-executing. It creates
a mere option in the holder to treat the note as due." Thus, in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, a bank has the absolute right, of setoff where
a debt has matured prior. to garnishment proceedings.
The instant case poses the following question. Did the recital providing
for acceleration when the obligee deemed the debt insecure, -'2 mature the
debt at some instance prior to garnishment? Pursuant to the decision
in Nickell v. Bradshaw,'5 and parallel cases, 4 an acceleration clause creates
a mere option to treat the note as due. Here, although the option existed
ab initio, it was not exercised until after garnishment. Thus, it appears that
the court in the noted case erroneously rendered the decision in favor of
the bank.
In defense of the court, although not stated in the opinion, it may be
contended that, since the event accelerating payment' 5 was in the exclusive
control of the bank, it is analogous to a demand note which is considered
matured ab initio."'
Douglas C. Kaplan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Defendant was tried for comnmission of a felony., A mistrial resulted
because a state's witness refused to testify, claiming privilege against self-
incrimination. Held, the defendant's rights under the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment' were not violated. Therefore, a second trial did
8. Thus, the garnishee is not limited to showiing that it once had a claim which
was collected by a bookkeeping entry before the writ was served. Aarons v. Pub. Service
Building & Loan Co., 318 Pa. 113, 178 Ati. 141 (1935).
9. Walters v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 7 Cal.2d 28, 59 P.2d
983 (1936).
10. Ardmore State Bank v. Lee, 61 Okla. 169, 159 Pac. 903 (1916).
11. Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore. 580, 183 Pac. 12 (1919).
12. ". . . or should the holder of this note deem the debt insecoie, the full amount
evidenced hereby shall become due and payable immediately at the election of the
holder of this note." State Nat. Bank of Decatur at Oneonta v. Towns, 62 So.2d 606,
607 (Ala. 1952). •
13. See note 11 su ra.
14. Holt v. Guaranty & Loan Co., 136 Ore. 272, 296 Pac. 852 (1931); Harrison
v. Beals, I11 Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924).
15. Considering the debt insecure.
16. Beilanski v. Say. Bank, 313 Mass. 577, 48 N.E.2d 627 (1943).
1. U. S. CoNs'r. AMIEND, XIV (nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
